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INTRODUCTION
The Thirteenth Amendment—the commandment that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States”—
did not truly eradicate incidents of slavery. This is hardly a controversial
point. The postwar emergence of the Black Codes—laws meant to confine African Americans’ ability to rent, travel, and live as free humans
would expect to—ensured that slavery’s conditions continued unabated.1
The Amendment itself permits slavery to exist “as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”2 Still, did the
*

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Capital Habeas Unit, Eastern District of Arkansas. Thanks for
the generous feedback I received from participants at the Korematsu Center’s 13th Amendment Conference. For their comments on previous drafts, I’m grateful to Daniel Sharfstein, Owen Jones, and
members of the Legal History of Race in the United States and Legal Scholarship seminars at Vanderbilt Law School.
1. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 199–201 (1988) (describing Black Codes); EDWARD
MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE PERIOD OF
RECONSTRUCTION 29–33 (1871) (reproducing Mississippi’s Black Codes).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. Of course, I am hardly the first person to note this point. For
an analysis of the “punishment for crime” clause and its contemporary relevance, see Kamal Ghali,
No Slavery Except as a Punishment for Crime: The Punishment Clause and Sexual Slavery, 55
UCLA L. REV. 607 (2008).
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Thirteenth Amendment not abolish the most fundamental characteristic
of chattel slavery—the ability to trade in and profit from the bodies of
other humans? Surprisingly, the answer is no. Even after emancipation,
slavery remained lucrative business in the form of antebellum contracts
for slaves. More surprisingly, most courts, and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court, permitted sellers of slaves on contract to recover the debts
owed to them. The Thirteenth Amendment no longer permitted commerce in flesh, but humans continued to have monetary value.
Why should we care about this seemingly esoteric episode in our
legal history? Did the post-bellum viability of slave contracts have any
real effect upon the freedmen? Lawsuits between old slave traders did
not diminish the way in which the freedmen carried themselves in the
world. If the remnants of slavery remained, that had nothing to do with
these commercial disputes. The Thirteenth Amendment had done its
work by freeing the slaves; contract law could sort out the paper remnants.
This is the view of the only work to thoroughly assess the interaction between the slave-contract cases and the Thirteenth Amendment,
Professor Andrew Kull’s thought-provoking study from two decades
ago.3 This Symposium provides an opportune moment to push back on
that view and to suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment could have—
and indeed, should have—prevented enforcement of slave contracts. I do
so not only with a fresh analysis of the known slave-contract cases, but
also by discussing a case that has been entirely unnoticed until now—one
in which the purchaser was himself a former slave attempting to free his
family. In this context, the consequence of enforcing the debt was literally to re-enslave the buyer. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s ultimate conclusion, it is incorrect that “[n]either the rights nor the interests of
those . . . [held] lately in bondage [were] affected” by the decision to enforce a slave contract.4 Far from being purely “private” agreements, these
instruments had a deep influence on the world beyond the parties.

3. Andrew Kull, The Enforceability After Emancipation of Debts Contracted for the Purchase
of Slaves, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 493, 530–32 (1994). Only one other author has devoted significant
attention to the slave-contract cases. In two pieces, Diane J. Klein assessed the cases in a manner
more sympathetic to nonenforcement than Kull’s approach. Diane J. Klein, Naming and Framing the
“Subject” of Antebellum Slave Contracts: Introducing Julia, “A Certain Negro Slave,” “A Man,”
Joseph, Eliza, and Albert, 9 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 243 (2008); Diane J. Klein, Paying Eliza:
Comity, Contracts and Critical Race Theory—19th Century Choice of Law Doctrine and the Validation of Antebellum Contracts for the Purchase and Sale of Human Beings, 20 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1
(2006). These articles address the slave-contract cases from the perspectives of conflict of laws and
critical race theory. Professor Kull’s article remains the only published piece to grapple with the
Thirteenth Amendment implications of the slave-contract cases.
4. Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654, 663 (1872).
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In short, this Article aims to fill in a missing chapter in Thirteenth
Amendment history, one that contributes to our understanding of why the
Amendment has not played more of a role in our constitutional law. In
the slave-contract cases, a provision that positively enacted a great natural-law principle—the freedom of man—succumbed to the sacredness of
personal property rights. An Amendment that promised a revolution in
federal-state relations could not overcome the entrenched principles of
local commercial law. This outcome was not inevitable, though, as the
opinion of one iconoclastic judge, Henry Clay Caldwell, shows. We do
well to examine this history—actual and alternative—as we consider the
Amendment’s position in today’s legal landscape and the possibilities it
contains.
I. THE SLAVE-CONTRACT PROBLEM
The typical form of slave paper was a run-of-the-mill promissory
note—the buyer’s guarantee to pay the seller sometime in the future, often secured by the purchased slaves themselves. There was nothing extraordinary about such agreements in the slaveholding states, but they
caused a unique problem when sellers sought to enforce them after the
Civil War. The Thirteenth Amendment banned slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment voided all claims “for the loss of . . . any slave.”5 Yet
appeals to the courts for payment on a slave contract appeared both to
vindicate slavery and to compensate a former slave owner. How were
courts to reconcile the Reconstruction Amendments with what had previously been a common commercial transaction?
From one perspective, courts asked to enforce slave contracts faced
a practical policy choice: which party was to bear the loss? One way or
the other, someone had to eat the value of the slave property embodied in
the paper. Emancipation had caused the buyer to forfeit his slave. Should
he forfeit the purchase price to boot? Or should the loss be split between
buyer and seller by refusing to permit the seller the money owed to him?
The quantity of these contracts made the loss-spreading question even
more vexing. Although the value of slaves in the form of postwar slave
contracts is not certain, slave contracts were common. Courts in every
former Confederate state, and even in some Union ones, faced remorseful buyers who sought to be relieved of their slave debt. Especially given
the enormous value of slaves—one historian has estimated it to be eighty
percent of the gross national product in 1860, equivalent to $9.75 trillion
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (“[N]either the United States or any State shall assume or pay
any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss of emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be
held illegal and void.”).

1012

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 39:1009

in today’s dollars6—we can be fairly certain that this legal battle threatened the ruin of either sellers or buyers as a class.7 Courts adjudicating
slave-contract disputes were thus the final decisionmakers in a scuffle
over the scraps of antebellum wealth.
Quite outside of this practical quandary, slave contracts posed a
great moral problem: did the decision to order payment for slaves not
sanction the law of slavery? Private agreements for slaves were clearly
valid at the time of their making, yet emancipation had wrecked the
foundation on which they were based. How could courts reconcile these
contract claims with a brand new Constitution—one that finally recognized the freedom of the nation’s black men and women?
The answers to these questions, for most jurists, were determined
by neither practical considerations nor moral reasoning. They were determined by the forms of the law. Courts consistently applied conventional concepts of commercial law to find that the slave seller was entitled to payment. Startlingly, most courts failed to consider that the Thirteenth Amendment might have something to say about how the issue
should be handled. Even some judges who declined to enforce the contracts limited their reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment, instead reaching their conclusions though typical legal arguments and forms. The
overall result was a lost opportunity to secure the rights of freedmen. Yet
some courts did find the contracts to perpetuate slavery. Their opinions
offer a different version of history, one whereby the Thirteenth Amendment provides a substantive guarantee of freedom.
II. LEGAL BASES FOR ENFORCING SLAVE CONTRACTS
As the Alabama Supreme Court set about deciding whether to enforce slave contracts, it noted the novelty of the issue: “It is in vain to
look for authorities in such cases as this, as there never was, before the
occurrence of such an event as the recent emancipation of the slaves in
this country.”8 The decisions of high courts throughout the South belied
the hollowness of this rhetoric. Courts had ample precedent to follow.
Principles of antebellum constitutional, common, and commercial law—
not the Reconstruction Amendments—supplied the legal grounds for
deciding most slave-contract cases. By relying on these older authorities,
6. David Brion Davis, Foreword: The Rocky Road to Freedom: Crucial Barriers to Abolition
in the Antebellum Years, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY
RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT xvi (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010).
7. Contemporary courts understood the gravity of the question in the same way. As the South
Carolina Supreme Court put it in a case involving the descendants of John C. Calhoun, “The case
before us is of interest to the community, from the large amount of debt which will be affected by
the decision.” Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283, 291 (1870).
8. Fitzpatrick v. Hearne, 44 Ala. 171, 175 (1870).
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courts almost universally upheld existing debts for slaves.9 There were
two distinct circumstances in which the question of enforcement came
before judges. In the first, state legislatures attempted to strip courts of
jurisdiction to hear suits brought by sellers asking for enforcement. In the
second, buyers argued that slave contracts were unenforceable by their
very nature.
A. Avoidance Through Legislative Means
As a condition of readmission to the Union, Congress required former Confederate states to hold conventions for the passage of new state
constitutions.10 Only after Congress approved the resulting document
would the state be permitted representation at the federal level. One of
the key items on the conventions’ agendas was debt forgiveness—
including forgiveness for debts owed on slave contracts. Six states produced, and Congress subsequently approved, constitutions prohibiting
judicial enforcement of slave contracts.11
What were the motives of the men who passed these provisions?
Some certainly objected to the idea that the courts of a free state should
be available to provide a remedy to former slave owners.12 Others, however, sensed in the elimination of slave debt the opportunity to provide
compensation that the Fourteenth Amendment otherwise prohibited.13
Indeed, nullification of the contracts might be the worse outcome from a
moral standpoint. The buyers had bet on slavery in its final hours, and
forgiving their debt could serve as nod to those who held fast to the
South. Perhaps nowhere is the ambiguity of the situation made clearer
than in a correspondence between Gideon Pillow, a Confederate general
9. Professor Kull has contended that it was right to apply pure commercial law to the cases and
that they were correctly decided on that basis. See Kull, supra note 3, at 531 (“[T]o decide the case
in favor of the buyer of slaves, whatever the grounds on which the court denied the seller’s suit, was,
as a matter of commercial law, to decide it wrong.”); id. at 532 ([T]o give [nullification arguments]
practical effect would have involved the nation in a political revolution that Reconstruction did not
envision.”). To void slave contracts through the Thirteenth Amendment, he argued, would have
disturbed settled legal rules and imposed a brand of retroactive justice that the political forces of the
time could not achieve. See id. (“A retroactive revision of property relations is easily within the
province of political justice, forming the basis for all confiscation and reallocation problems, but no
such revision was attempted by the Thirteenth Amendment.”). Though this Article disputes Professor Kull’s conclusion, his piece is a nuanced and enlightening treatment that explains why it was not
self-evident to Reconstruction actors that nullifying slave contracts was the correct move. I am indebted to his thorough analysis of the problem.
10. For general background on the conventions, see FONER, supra note 1, at 316–33.
11. The six states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina
(with the caveat that Alabama’s provision was an ordinance rather than an amendment to the state
constitution). For the text of these provisions, as well as proposed provisions that failed, see Kull,
supra note 3, at 533–38.
12. See id. at 522–23.
13. See id. at 523–24.
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and one of the largest slaveholders in Arkansas and Tennessee, and Senator Charles Sumner, the Radical Republican stalwart. Sumner had just
proposed a bill stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear suits seeking enforcement of contracts for slaves. Pillow sent his thanks; he was
being sued for $109,000 in slave debt.14 As Pillow’s enthusiasm indicates, the question of whether to enforce may have been a moral wash.15
When it came time to test the nullification measures in courts, judges had little to do with these real-world ambiguities. Their reasoning was
almost purely legal, and it was based not on express policy considerations but rather on a technical question of constitutional law: did any
state in the Confederacy actually secede? Clearly, sellers argued in seeking enforcement, the nullification measures abrogated slave contracts and
violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.16 Buyers responded,
however, that the abrogation was permissible for two reasons. First, the
states were outside the Union when they devised the ban on slavecontract enforcement—in other words, they were not actually “states”
subject to the prohibition of the Contracts Clause. Second, because Congress approved the state constitutions—or “dictated” their terms, as one
court put it17—and because the Federal Constitution did not prevent
Congress from impairing the obligation of contracts, there was no
wrongdoing on the part of the states.
This rather clever argument succeeded only in Georgia, abetted by
Congress’s decision to strike a number of debt-forgiveness provisions
from the state’s proposed constitution while leaving its slave-contract
prohibition intact.18 The United States Supreme Court deflated it once
and for all in White v. Hart.19 The Court held that the state constitution,
far from being dictated by Congress, was “voluntary,” and even had it
not been, Congress had no authority to approve a state measure that vio-

14. See id. at 506. The correspondence is more fully related in CHARLES FAIRMAN,
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–88, PART ONE 860 n.289 (1971).
15. See Kull, supra note 3, at 530 (“Depending on the viewpoint of the observer, the nullification of slave debts was thus either the last tribute due to loyalty, or the last exaction of a Bourbon
class, advanced in the name of its final representatives. Inevitably it was both at once, besides being
(in the eyes of others still) the final vindication of longstanding abolitionist doctrine on the illegality
of slavery by natural law.”).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”). Some jurists sought a way around this conclusion by drawing a distinction
between a state’s authority to regulate its courts’ jurisdiction and its authority to impair contracts.
See Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625, 660 (1869) (McClure, J., dissenting). However, the prevailing
view was that to strip individuals of a judicial forum to enforce their contracts was to impair the
obligations of the contracts themselves.
17. Shorter v. Cobb, 39 Ga. 285, 303–04 (1869).
18. Id. at 305; White v. Hart, 39 Ga. 306, 307 (1869).
19. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1871).
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lated the Federal Constitution.20 To the notion that the state had seceded
from the Union, the Court held that for the duration of the war the states’
“rights under the Constitution were suspended, but not destroyed.”21
Thus perished the theory that nullification of slave contracts fell outside
the Contracts Clause.22
The real flaw of White v. Hart was not so much its take on whether
a state could leave the Union—a serious and nuanced question in the jurisprudence of the time23—but rather that it entirely ignored the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court failed to distinguish contracts involving
subject matter such as bonds—another context in which the legality of
secession arose—from those involving human bondage. Even had a state
no ability to leave the Union, the question remained whether the state
constitutional provisions were an appropriate means of enforcing the
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery. Chief Justice Salmon
Chase, at least, believed that they were.24 Few, however, stopped to consider how the Reconstruction Amendments might have altered the original Constitution’s Contracts Clause. Even those judges who believed the
state provisions to be constitutional appeared more concerned with fairness toward the contracting parties than with the postwar status of the
freedmen.25 By relying upon the Contracts Clause to require enforce20. Id. at 649.
21. Id. at 651.
22. The Court’s rationales in White v. Hart might be questioned. It seems absurd to claim that
states taking up arms against the federal government remained part of the Union during conflict—a
point that several contemporary jurists acknowledged. See, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
700, 737 (1869) (Grier, J., dissenting) (“This is to be decided as a political fact, not as a legal fiction.
This court is bound to know and notice the public history of the nation. If I regard the truth of history
for the last eight years, I cannot discover the State of Texas as one of these United States.”). In the
face of this reality, White v. Hart had to rely on a semantic distinction between territories, which
Congress would “admit to the Union” as new states, and the reconstructed antebellum states, which
under the Reconstruction Acts would not be “readmitted to the union” but instead would be “entitled” or “admitted to” representation in Congress. Hart, 80 U.S. at 652. The language of the Reconstruction Acts apparently proved that the States of the Confederacy never left. Nevertheless, the
result was consistent with the Court’s precedents on postwar problems such as the validity of confederate bond debt. See Texas, 74 U.S. at 726 (holding that Texas continued as part of the Union
even after secession); see also HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER
LAW 460–63 (1982) (discussing importance of holdings in Texas v. White and White v. Hart to the
Radical Republicans’ program).
23. See Herman Belz, Deep-Conviction Jurisprudence and Texas v. White: A Comment on G.
Edward White’s Historicist Interpretation of Chief Justice Chase, 21 N. KY. L. REV. 117, 123–30
(1993) (discussing importance of the question and its resolution in Texas v. White).
24. Osborn, 80 U.S. at 664 (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (“[C]lauses in State constitutions, acts of
State legislatures, and decisions of State courts, warranted by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, cannot be held void as in violation of the original Constitution, which forbids the States to
pass any law violating the obligation of contracts.”).
25. See McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 48, 81 (1870) (Peters, J., dissenting) (“The seeming injustice of [enforcing the contract], appears from the fact, that the appellant will be made to pay quite
eight thousand dollars, in legal funds, to the appellee, for property in persons, now citizens of the
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ment, the cases ending in White obscured the conflict between old and
new constitutional orders that was inherent in the slave contract cases.26
B. Avoidance Through Judicial Means
The conflict between old and new was more clearly at issue in a series of cases squarely arguing that the destruction of slavery also destroyed antebellum contracts for slaves. In these cases, the question was
not whether a state had power to nullify contracts, but rather whether the
very nature of the contracts rendered them unenforceable. The argument
came in three forms, each based in commercial law: First, that the end of
slavery violated warranties that sellers had given as to the quality of their
slaves. Second, that the end of slavery caused a “failure of consideration”
that relieved buyers of their obligations under the contract. And third,
that the end of slavery rendered slave contracts void as against public
policy.
The weakest of these arguments posited that emancipation voided
the seller’s warranty that the slave would be a “slave for life.” Such warranties were boilerplate—default language included in almost all slave
contracts. They meant that the slave at the heart of the contract was not
free or physically damaged at the time of sale. They did not guarantee
that the slave would remain enslaved for the duration of his life or that
slavery would never come to an end.
Postwar courts had no problem adopting this interpretation of slave
warranties. The Florida Supreme Court, for example, rested its decision
on the distinction between insurance against loss, which the parties could
have agreed to separately, and a basic warranty as to the nature of the
slave at sale. Had the parties wished to warrant against the end of slavery, the Court stated,
they would doubtless have been more explicit in making known that
intention than by adopting a stereotyped formula, which had been in
use under an entirely different condition of things for more than two
hundred years. Such an intention, clearly manifested by the terms
used, would have imparted to the instrument rather the character of

State, who had been declared enfranchised by the nation, and whose emancipation the nation was
most solemnly pledged to make good; and yet, get comparatively nothing of value for his money.”);
Shorter v. Cobb, 39 Ga. 285, 304 (1869) (“[I]t would be alike rigorous and unjust to hold that creditors were the only class whose property was insured against the contingencies and losses incident to
the war; that a bond, note, or mortgage was the only property too sacred to be touched, and too secure to be affected during the general wreck of fortunes, and ruin of families.”).
26. See Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625, 645 (1869) (“A change of Constitution can not [sic]
release a State from a contract made under a Constitution which permits it to be made.”).
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a “policy of insurance” than that of an ordinary warranty of title and
of continuous possession.27

Courts considered agreements for slaves made at such a late date to be
“risking contracts,”28 gambles that slaves would still have value at the
end of the Civil War. As a matter of commercial law, the doctrine of eminent domain was sufficient to resolve the warranty issue in favor of the
seller. Time and again, courts reasoned analogically that, just as a seller
of land does not guarantee against future government confiscation, so too
did the buyer bear the risk that the government would end the institution
of slavery.29
A separate theory, closely related to the warranty claim, argued that
the end of slavery caused the contracts to suffer from “failure of consideration.” This argument depended in large part on the date of slavery’s
end: at what point did it become illegal to contract for slaves? The
Emancipation Proclamation Cases,30 a Texas decision, was exemplary of
the way courts treated this question. In this particular case, the contracts
had been made after the Emancipation Proclamation but before the end
of hostilities between the North and South. The majority’s opinion was
dedicated to a refutation of the Emancipation Proclamation’s legal force.
A mere war measure, it was no authority for freedom of its own accord.
In the court’s view, only a decisive cessation of hostilities could confirm
slavery’s end, and only slavery’s end could make a contract for slaves
illegal: “Until slavery was abolished, no feature of it was destroyed.
Owners of slaves had all the rights of property therein, and the one not
the least in importance is its vendible quality.”31 For the Texas Supreme
Court, the Emancipation Proclamation was about timing, not about the
broader meaning of freedom.
The dissent to the Emancipation Proclamation Cases, penned by
Andrew Jackson Hamilton, relied less on exegesis of the Proclamation’s
legal power and more on the realities that it represented for slave owners.
Even if the Proclamation could not free the slaves instantaneously, its
effect was to declare decisively that slavery was contrary to the policy of
the legitimate government. How, then, could a court now support a contract that ran against that policy? “The question here,” wrote Hamilton,
is not as to the moment in time when the former slaves in Texas actually obtained their freedom by events of the war; but it is whether
27. Walker v. Gatlin, 12 Fla. 9, 14–15 (1867).
28. McElvain, 44 Ala. at 55.
29. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283, 303 (1870); Walker, 12 Fla. at 15–17; Scott v.
Scott, 59 Va. 150, 176–77 (1868) (Moncure, J., concurring).
30. Hall v. Keese, 31 Tex. 504 (1868).
31. Id. at 526.

1018

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 39:1009

now the courts will aid in carrying out and enforcing contracts
against the public policy of the government, pronounced in the most
solemn form as both sovereign and belligerent in a great civil war.32

Hamilton’s dissent was a species of the final major theory against enforcement: that slave contracts were void based on public policy. But
whereas Hamilton had tried to ground the public policy argument on the
foundation of the Emancipation Proclamation—and indeed, he would
have upheld slave contracts made prior to its issuance33—other judges
adopted a broader public policy argument. In Louisiana, the only state
whose courts consistently nullified slave contracts, judges mixed castigation of slavery’s morality with somewhat more legalistic analysis in the
vein of Hamilton’s opinion. For instance, in Wainwright v. Bridges, Louisiana’s foundational slave-contract case, the court opined that slavery
was a relic of “barbarous ages.”34 It had persisted in American culture as
a matter of expediency, but “the moral conscience of men no longer
permitted them to sustain slavery as a thing of right.”35 This broader
point made, the court went on to hold that slave contracts were abolished
along with slavery itself: “The fiat of the sovereign is potent to release
the contracting parties, as well as potent to set the bondman free. Its
sweep is general, and its wisdom does justice to all.”36
These passages indicate that judges who refused to enforce slave
contracts relied primarily on freewheeling application of principles of
justice. Their opinions contained little exegesis of common law, statute,
or the Constitution. Most courts, however, were eager to combat a mode
of thought that did not rely on pure legal reasoning. As the Tennessee
Supreme Court succinctly put it, “[w]ith the morality of slavery we have
nothing to do, but simply to announce the laws of property as we find
them in reference to contracts of this character.”37 In sum, the strategy of
courts that enforced slave contracts was to adhere to established common
32. Id. at 553 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 552–53 (“As to the executed contracts of this sort, however reprehensible they may
be, it is a matter of no concern to the courts of the country or to the laws of the land, provided the
persons who were bought and sold have in fact obtained their freedom.”).
34. Wainwright v. Bridges, 19 La. Ann. 234, 238 (1867).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 240.
37. Lewis v. Woodfolk, 61 Tenn. 25, 53 (1872); see also McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 48, 52
(1870) (“I do not propose to go into an elaborate discussion of the abstract right, or morality of the
institution of slavery, as it existed in this country before the date of said proclamation. To do so, I am
persuaded will accomplish no good purpose, and, most probably, we would come out of the discussion but little wiser, and, I think, certainly no better than when we entered upon it.”); Jacoway v.
Denton, 25 Ark. 625, 636 (1869) (“[W]e must act as rational men; we must accept the law as it was
and now is with imperfections; we must examine slavery as it was; we must consider the nation, the
State and the people as they were, not as we think they should have been; and in this view only can
we arrive at a correct conclusion and duly appreciate the rights of the parties to this suit.”).
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law precedents. The principles of commercial law that demanded enforcement were deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal thought—so
firmly rooted, in fact, that judges could cite seventeenth-century English
cases to support the proposition that a buyer bears the risk that the government will take property.38
Ancient authority did not precisely parallel the problem of slave
contracts, of course. Slavery had always posed special legal puzzles of its
own, given the dual nature of the slave as both property and human being, and questions that defied conventional analysis continued to arise in
the slave-contract cases. For example, to enforce the contracts, courts
were required to draw a conceptual distinction between the slave as tangible property—a sort of property that was now illegal—and the monetary value of the slave memorialized on paper. A decision against enforcement also posed a unique problem of judicial administration. Was
there any limitation on these suits? If slave contracts were invalid only
because slavery was immoral, a party who bought a slave on contract in
1830 had just as valid a claim that his bargain was null as the buyer who
completed his contract in 1863.39 Blatant sympathy for slavery played a
role in the judicial calculus as well. In their most candid moments, judges
excoriated the non-enforcement theory as a regrettable attack on the
Southern past.40
38. Scott v. Scott, 59 Va. 150, 176–77 (1868) (Moncure, J., concurring) (citing Paradine v.
Jane, [1647] EWHC KB J5).
39. See Henderlite v. Thurman, 63 Va. 466, 479 (1872) (“The purchaser of a slave long before
the war may with equal propriety claim an abatement of the purchase money, upon the ground of a
failure of title and consideration by act of the government. If he has already paid, he would, for the
same reason, be equally entitled to recover back such share or proportion of the purchase money as
would compensate him for the loss sustained.”).
The caveat, of course, is that a fully executed contract for slaves did not require the intervention of the courts. Such reasoning was a facile way for judges to avoid the core issue: should the
judiciary lend its authority to the enforcement of contracts based upon a discredited form of property? In the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court, through the Equal Protection Clause, rejected
attempts to use the judiciary as a means of enforcing private discrimination. See Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Similarly, nineteenth century judges
might have declined to permit private parties to enforce slave contracts in a judicial forum—though
this would have required the additional step of concluding that slave contracts ran afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment. For an argument that Shelley should have been decided on Thirteenth Amendment grounds, see Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 483–91 (2007).
40. Henderlite, 63 Va. at 477 (“The proposition [that the contract is against public policy]
involves, in my judgment, an admission derogatory to our whole previous history. Notwithstanding
the institution was recognized as lawful and constitutional by both State and Federal government,
was sustained by public sentiment, was interwoven with the entire framework of society, and was
believed by men eminent in wisdom and piety to be in accordance with the principles of religion,
humanity, and justice; notwithstanding all this, because it has been destroyed by paramount force,
we are expected not only to give it up without a murmur, but to surrender all our previous convictions, to yield our faith and consciences to the keeping of others, and henceforth to believe that slav-
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Regardless of these nuances, the established forms of the common
law provided an easy answer to pleas for relief, and postwar courts clung
to these forms when faced with slave contracts. Had they inquired into
the meaning of the new Constitution and the Thirteenth Amendment—
and few state judges did—they would have found the issue vastly more
complicated.
III. OSBORN V. NICHOLSON AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
COUNTERARGUMENT
To gain a different view of how to treat slave contracts, we must
exchange the state courts for the federal circuit courts—specifically the
Eastern District of Arkansas. In that forum arose Osborn v. Nicholson,41
which would eventually put a decisive end to the slave-contract controversy. Osborn involved a $1,300 debt for a twenty-three-year-old slave
named Albert, contracted on the eve of Fort Sumter in March 1861.
These facts did little to distinguish it from the numerous other slavecontract cases of the era. Yet Osborn is remarkable for two reasons.
First, Judge Henry Clay Caldwell’s circuit court decision is the most
clearly realized opinion against enforcement, not to mention one of the
few to justify that outcome based on the Thirteenth Amendment.42 Second, the Supreme Court’s opinion reversing Caldwell and enforcing the
contract presented a starkly different view of freedom and personal
rights—and provided an early example of the postwar Court’s tendency
to favor established interests over freedmen and other exploited people.43
Read together, these two writings illustrate alternative visions of the Reconstruction Constitution and the Thirteenth Amendment’s place within
it.
A biographical sketch portrays Henry Clay Caldwell as a man who
“saw the law as an instrument of substantive justice.”44 Caldwell’s Osborn opinion—a jeremiad against the slave states’ rejection of natural
liberty and a prophecy for freedom under the Reconstruction Constitution—certainly supports this characterization. The opinion’s decisional
ery was wrong in itself—a curse upon our country—a moral leprosy which corrupted the life-blood
of the nation.”).
41. Osborn v. Nicholson, 18 F. Cas. 846 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1870) (No. 10,595), rev’d, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 654 (1872).
42. Caldwell’s opinion is most certainly flawed. It is a rather baggy document that relies excessively on analogy to other cases. But it is difficult to express how effective the opinion is when it
breaks free of legalistic form, particularly in the final five pages.
43. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 1, at 529–31 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court’s retreat from
the Reconstruction Amendments).
44. Richard S. Arnold & George C. Freeman, III, Judge Henry Clay Caldwell, 23 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 317, 317 (2001).
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basis is something entirely different than what we see in the state cases,
including those that forgave the debt. Caldwell’s refusal to enforce was
not founded on “failure of consideration” or on a technical parsing of the
state’s power to abrogate slave contracts under the Contracts Clause.
And while the opinion as a whole might be accurately characterized as a
public policy argument, Caldwell’s position, unlike other public policy
arguments, was fully informed by the substantive implications of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
Caldwell made two major points in the course of his opinion. He
began by drawing a distinction between “natural” law and “municipal” or
“positive” law. He reasoned that slavery was a violation of natural law
and supported only by the positive law of the states. Abolition of positive
slave law destroyed not only the property right in slaves but also the
remedy by which that right could be enforced:
It was only by virtue of the slave code of the state, that the plaintiff
ever could have maintained an action in any court on this contract.
The common law would afford him no remedy, and the statute giving the remedy, having been repealed by article 13 of amendments,
of the constitution of the United States, he is without remedy.45

In this vision—very much rooted in the antislavery thought of the
antebellum era—the Thirteenth Amendment serves the remedial purpose
of restoring the law to its natural state. Because natural law did not respect the right of the slave owner,46 its forms could not justify the enforcement of slave contracts once positive law had been swept away.47
Caldwell might have rested his opinion entirely on this interaction
between natural and positive law. But his second point went further—he
analyzed the Thirteenth Amendment as a provision with a substantive
force of its own. To be sure, the Thirteenth Amendment contained notions of natural law that Caldwell relied on elsewhere in his opinion. The
Amendment, he wrote, was passed “for the purpose of restoring the
45. Osborn, 18 F. Cas. at 850.
46. For a discussion about the interaction between natural law, positive law, and slavery, see
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 8–30 (1975).
47. Caldwell used similar reasoning to uphold Arkansas’s constitutional prohibition on enforcement. Because it was completely within the power of the states to abolish slavery under the old
Constitution, slaveholding states could sanction abolition without violating the Contracts Clause. See
Osborn, 18 F. Cas. at 852 (“Now if slave property was excepted from the operation of [the commerce] power, on the ground that the power over that subject was exclusively with the several states,
upon which principle of logic or rule of construction can it be claimed that the constitution of the
United States throws its protecting shield over the slave dealer, and the contracts growing out of that
traffic?”). Caldwell pointed out that the state’s authority over slavery was so great that it was justified to destroy the marriage contract between Dred Scott and his wife once Scott was taken from
freedom and brought back to slavery in Missouri. If the state power over slavery could be used to
destroy a marriage contract, then certainly it could be used to destroy a contract for slaves. Id. at 851.
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slaves to their natural rights, and conforming the institutions and laws of
the republic and of the several states to the immutable law of eternal justice, and making the fact conform to the theory upon which our form of
government is based.”48 But when viewed alongside the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment not only restored natural law,
but also established its own positive law of freedom:
The effect of these amendments cannot be limited to the mere severance of the legal relation of master and slave. They are farreaching in their results. Under them the former slave is now a citizen,
possessing and enjoying all the rights of other citizens of the republic. Can any one doubt that it was the object and purpose of these
amendments to strike down slavery and all its incidents, and all
rights of action based upon it?49

By focusing on citizenship and the incidents of slavery, Caldwell suggested that the Thirteenth Amendment was a substantive embodiment of
liberty with which slave contracts could not be reconciled.
In the most evocative part of his opinion—indeed, the most vivid
passage to appear in any of the slave-contract cases—Caldwell provides
his interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment in an even more tangible
form:
[T]his court, in the trial of [a claim for breach of a slave warranty],
must inquire into the mental and physical condition of a citizen of
the republic, with a view of ascertaining his value as a chattel. And
it may chance that the subject of this inquiry is a juror or officer of
the court, and indeed it might occur that the judge on the bench
would be the subject of such an inquiry. The mind revolts at the trial
of such an issue. It would be giving full force and effect to one of the
most obnoxious features of the slave code. It would be placing the
free man, who may be the subject matter of such a suit, in an attitude before the court and the country that no free government will
permit, jealous of the rights and honor of its citizens, and whose
policy is to instill into their minds a love of country and its free institutions. The government that would permit its free citizens to be
thus degraded in the interest of slavery and slave traders, would be
unworthy of the name of a free republic.50

With this passage, Caldwell turned the warranty argument, so easily dismissed by other courts, on its head. On this view, the warranty in a slave
contract was more than boilerplate. It provided a license to inspect a
freedman in exactly the same fashion as if he had been a slave. Cald48. Id. at 854–55.
49. Id. at 855 (emphasis added).
50. Id. (emphasis added).
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well’s scenario, even if fanciful,51 provided a powerful argument that
slave contracts were incidents of slavery barred by the Thirteenth
Amendment. By contrasting slavery’s incidents to citizenship rights,
Caldwell provided a more concrete basis for decision than the fuzzier
notions of natural law and public policy. A citizen could never be the
subject of contract. How then could a freedman?
The Supreme Court, with only Chief Justice Chase dissenting, refuted every aspect of Caldwell’s reasoning. It rejected the notion that
slavery was law only in jurisdictions where supported by statute: “Being
valid when and where it was made, [the contract] was so everywhere.”52
In the Court’s view, slaves had long been “covered by the same protection as other property.”53 Eradication of the positive law of slavery did
not eradicate the common law of contract. Given that slaves were a legal
form of property when the contract was made, the question of enforceability was governed by the principles of contract law. The most relevant
analogy was to eminent domain. Just as the buyer of real property bore
the risk that the government would convert it to public use, so too the
buyer of a slave bore the risk that the government would eliminate slavery as a valid form of property.54 In short, much of the language upon
which the Court based its opinion could have been lifted from one of the
many state decisions on the issue.
Had the Court stopped there, the opinion would have been notable
mainly for its unique posture. It did not stop there, however. Instead, it
explained why the case implicated due process—that of former slaveholders. By the time of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court explained,
the right of the seller to his payment had become “legally and completely
vested.”55 The real danger of Caldwell’s ruling was that refusal to enforce a vested contract right would “take away one man’s property and
give it to another. . . . [T]he deprivation would be without due process of
law. This is forbidden by the fundamental principles of the social compact, and is beyond the sphere of the legislative authority both of the
States and the Nation.”56 In short, the Court went beyond the proper application of common law rules to announce a philosophy of natural liberty and substantive justice—one completely at odds with Caldwell’s.57
51. In fact, after the Civil War, juries did sometimes decide whether certain slaves had been
“defective” under a warranty. See Trimble v. Isbell, 51 Ala. 356, 358 (1874).
52. Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1872).
53. Id. at 661.
54. Id. at 659.
55. Id. at 662.
56. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See id. at 663 (“Whatever we may think of the institution of slavery viewed in the light of
religion, morals, humanity, or a sound political economy,-as the obligation here in question was
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Indeed, this is the very sort of substantive due process argument that the
Court would use to protect economic rights well into the twentieth century.58
The Osborn case is important not simply for ending the slavecontract dispute, but for presenting two opposing visions of the postwar
constitutional order. In the Court’s view, the Reconstruction Amendments did little to alter the relationship between the individual property
owner and the state. For sure, they forbade slavery and compensation for
the loss of slaves. But where these specific prohibitions did not speak,
the individual retained the extent of his property interest. Natural law
was relevant only insofar as it required protection of a private, vested
right—even if that right found its roots in slavery.
For Caldwell, the issue was more complex. The Reconstruction
Amendments did not merely abolish slavery—they altered the entirety of
the constitutional structure. Though the antebellum Constitution would
have given the seller a remedy, the new Constitution demanded a different result.59 Most fundamentally, the Thirteenth Amendment ensured that
individual property interests would no longer take precedence over the
liberty rights of freedmen as a class. Caldwell saw his role as to decide
whether “the good of the community at large is taken to be of more importance than the claim of the individual.”60 That decision was not based
on Caldwell’s own predilections. Rather, it was moored to the Thirteenth
Amendment, which showed that “slavery is condemned in all its features.”61 Indeed, Caldwell appears to be the first judge to have read the
Thirteenth Amendment as an affirmative prohibition on the relics of
slavery.
But Caldwell’s broader view was not to be the law. Under the
Court’s interpretation of the new Constitution, the decisive question—
answered as soon it was asked—was whether enforcement carried
freedmen back into literal slavery. As the Court saw it, “[n]either the

valid when executed, sitting as a court of justice, we have no choice but to give it effect.” (emphasis
added)).
58. See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 17–25 (2007) (tracing development of the concept of civil rights from Reconstruction to the New Deal).
59. Osborn v. Nicholson, 18 F. Cas. 846, 854 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1870) (No. 10,595) (“These
amendments are the work of the sovereign people of the United States. There are no technical rules
to obstruct or prevent their full operation presently on all persons, matters, and things within their
scope. Obligation of contracts and vested rights, based on slavery, cannot be set up to impede or
restrain their operation. And no one can escape from their operation by the cry of the ‘constitution as
it was.’”).
60. Id. at 855.
61. Id.
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rights nor the interests of those held lately in bondage [were] affected”
by enforcement of a slave contract.62
IV. CONTRACTS FOR SLAVES BY SLAVES
To the trained legal mind, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Osborn has a satisfying logic. In the field of law, there is nothing especially
problematic about separating the right to a thing from the possession of
the thing itself. The slave had her freedom—the use of her own body—
and that was as it should be. But why should that freedom affect in the
least a disembodied right to the slave’s labor? As Professor Kull has argued, there was a certain dissonance in making the seller bear the loss of
the slave. Refusal to enforce the slave contracts made emancipation retroactive to sellers, who by a temporal trick lost the value of their property even where it had remained valid in law.63 Morally satisfying as voiding the contract may have been, it could not make emancipation retroactive to the slaves themselves, who of course remained in bondage until
the end of the war.
This reasoning is complicated, however, if we consider a particular
type of contract that has eluded the attention of scholars: one where the
buying party was himself a former slave purchasing freedom for his family. In such cases, enforcement of the contract had an opposite temporal
effect than it did when the parties were exclusively white. Rather than
simply vindicating the white seller by refusing to make emancipation of
his slave retroactive, enforcement carried forward the shackles of slavery
well beyond the institution’s expiration date. In a very real sense, a
freedman forced to make good on his antebellum agreements was still
chained to his master. And this realization forces us to reconsider the
assumption that freedmen were unaffected by being the subject of an antebellum contract between whites.
Consider Andrews v. Page.64 In December 1857, Henry Page, a free
man of color and owner of 321 acres of land,65 made an agreement with
William B. Andrews, a Tennessee slave owner. In exchange for a $3,200
bill of sale, Page received three slaves: Page’s wife, Dilly, and Page’s
62. Osborn, 80 U.S. at 663.
63. See Kull, supra note 3, at 494 (“Nullification . . . pushed back the effective date of emancipation as between these buyers and sellers, denying to the seller the fruit of his favorable bargain and
relieving the buyer from the consequences of his unfavorable one.”).
64. Andrews v. Page, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 653 (1871).
65. Page possessed equitable title to all but thirteen acres of the land. Record of Prior Proceedings, Andrews v. Page, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 653 (1871) (on file at Tennessee State Library and Archives, Manuscript Section, box 2404). An equitable titleholder enjoys use and possession of land
but does not have actual ownership. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “beneficial owner”).
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children, Bill and Britt. When the note came due in January 1861, Page
was nowhere to be found. Andrews placed an attachment on Page’s
property, but the Civil War’s intervention prevented him from carrying it
out. During the war, Page died working on a sawmill, leaving his family
to live on the land. Though the war freed Page’s family, it had not freed
Page of his obligation to Andrews. Andrews thus sought to take the Page
property in satisfaction of the note.
The resulting opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court is a remarkable illustration of how the vestiges of slavery continued to loom over
freedmen after the Civil War. The court expressly declined to decide the
case on the basis of the Thirteenth Amendment, or to inquire whether
Page freed his family when he purchased them.66 It did not address
whether the contract was valid or whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866
prohibited attachment.67 Instead, it decided the case under the law of
slave marriages. Because that law recognized that Page and Dilly had
entered into a valid marriage while enslaved, and because a postwar statute ratified that law, Dilly was entitled to a dower interest in the property.68
That a freedwoman could take her former owner to court and win a
judgment in her favor may seem a startling result. But, at least in Dilly
Page’s case, success was deceptive. The court never considered the possibility that the contract might have been invalid because made for
slaves—or that the purchaser was not a coequal white slave owner, but
rather a husband and father purchasing his wife and children.69 Through
dower, Dilly would be able to keep part of her land.70 But it would only
66. Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 658 (“The rights of the parties can not be determined upon the constitution and laws as they now exist, but are to be ascertained under the constitution and laws as they
existed . . . at the time of the death of Henry Page, in 1864.”). Cf. Osborn, 18 F. Cas. at 854 (“It must
not be forgotten that this question must be determined under the constitution of the United States, as
it stands now.”).
67. Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 656.
68. Id. at 670–71.
69. See id. at 658 (“Dilly presented a petition for rehearing, in which she alleged that Harry had
not purchased her for the purpose of making her his slave, but as a wife, and to make her a free
woman.”). The case does not indicate whether Page himself had once been Andrews’s slave, or
whether he had always been free. My research has shown that Page was born around 1788 in Virginia. SMITH COUNTY, TENNESSEE, CENSUS OF 1850, at 164 (Thomas E. Partlow ed.) (on file at Tennessee State Library and Archives). One explanation for Page’s move—perhaps the best explanation,
considering that the natural path of migration for a free black prior to the Civil War was northward
rather than southward—is that a master or slave trader transported him to Tennessee.
70. My estimation is that she would get to keep 107 acres. Dower typically protected one-third
of the husband’s real property, and Andrews explicitly held that the property over which Henry Page
held equitable title would be included. Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 670–71. Of course, this seems like a
rather large chunk of land. But the amount of land is not really relevant to my argument—the point
remains that Dilly’s former owner could strip her of over two hundred acres of land because her
slave status was enshrined in a contract.
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be a part. Andrews was entitled to satisfy the debt Henry Page contracted
for Dilly’s freedom from the rest.71 Furthermore, the Page children were
unprotected, because the court awarded Andrews a remainder in the
property that was subject to dower.72 Unless the debt could be repaid, no
future generation of Pages would enjoy this land.
The Thirteenth Amendment emancipated Dilly Page and forbade
that she ever again be treated as property. But it did not prevent her former owner from continuing to extract value from her. In one sense, Henry Page’s contract was no different than numerous other contracts for
slaves—Andrews acquired the contract right when slave property was
legal, and abolition of a slave’s status as property did not also abolish the
right. Yet Page’s contract also had a key difference—it permitted Dilly’s
former master to take land that would rightfully be hers but for her prior
status as a slave. Enforcement meant that Dilly was not truly free from
her obligations to her master. This was most certainly not, as the Supreme Court wrote in Osborn, a situation where “[n]either the rights nor
the interests of those . . . lately in bondage [were] affected.”73
By showing the freedman not as abstract “consideration” for money, but instead as a live human being, Andrews v. Page forces us to reassess enforcement’s broader implications for emancipation. It is true that
very few slave-contract cases placed upon freedmen the sort of real burden that enforcement caused Dilly Page. There is no evidence that courts
were awash in claims by whites against their former slaves. But this single agreement alone brings the entirety of the slave-contract edifice into
sharp relief. Enforcement of every one of these contracts hinged on an
assumption that former slaves were less than fully free. If slave contracts
could be enforced, freedmen retained something of their character of
property—even if expressed as “vested rights” instead of tangible ownership. This was not a harmless attitude in an era where a major aspiration
of the moneyed Southern class was to retain the labor relations that prevailed during slavery.74
Andrews v. Page provides a different perspective on the slavecontract problem—one in which it is much easier to see slave contracts
as an outcropping of slavery that should have been barred under the Thirteenth Amendment. For freed slaves such as Dilly Page, who still owed
money on the purchase price of their freedom, the authority of the master
71. Id. at 671.
72. Id.
73. Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654, 663 (1872).
74. See FONER, supra note 1, at 428 (“Equally important among the aims of violence was the
restoration of labor discipline on white-owned farms and plantations. In a sense, the Klan sought to
take the place of both the departed personal authority of the master and the labor control function the
Reconstruction state had abandoned.”).
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and his entitlement to take their property represented a direct return to
the law of slavery. These contracts re-imposed the legal incidents of
slave status. Perhaps these implications were not so obvious in the runof-the-mill dispute between white buyers. Yet, some visionaries, such as
Caldwell, saw them. The failure of his fellow jurists to join him marks
perhaps the first missed opportunity for courts to embrace the Thirteenth
Amendment’s possibilities.
CONCLUSION
The past has a powerful hold on legal minds. Reconstruction-era
judges, as much as any, were eager to “roll back the tide of time, and to
imagine ourselves in the presence of the circumstances by which the parties were surrounded when and where the contract is said to have been
made.”75 The slave-contract cases are consistent with that rule. As Aviam
Soifer has said of the post-bellum period, “the most private and individualistic legal categories seemed quickly and convincingly to overcome all
others. Contract law triumphed in the legal imagination and permeated
popular belief.”76 In an era that elevated the formal power to contract
above all, perhaps it is not so remarkable that most judges had nothing to
say about the freedmen upon which litigants’ contractual rights were
based.
What is remarkable is the lengths to which most courts went to ignore the Thirteenth Amendment when asked to enforce contracts for
slaves. The Amendment marked a positive enactment of the natural-law
prohibition on slavery. Yet the Supreme Court ignored this positive law
in favor of natural-law principles forbidding truncation of property
rights. The Amendment promised a revolution in the relationship between the federal government and the states—one that permitted the federal government to wipe away the sort of state-law contract doctrines that
countenanced enforcement of slave contracts. Yet when the Supreme
Court enforced the federal Constitution against the states, it gave the
Contracts Clause, not the Thirteenth Amendment, primacy of place. At
worst, these attitudes could actually re-enslave freedmen. Though Henry
Clay Caldwell probably did not have the likes of Dilly Page in mind
when he ruled, he understood that slave contracts, even if once legal,
could not exist in the world the Thirteenth Amendment had made. Traditional forms of adjudication could not answer everything. As we contin-

75. Hall v. United States, 92 U.S. 27, 30 (1875). In this case, the Court concluded that a former
slave could not assert a contractual claim over cotton seized by the U.S. Army during the Civil War
because slaves had no legal ability to contract.
76. Aviam Soifer, Contract, Status, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916, 1941–42 (1987).
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ue to test the Thirteenth Amendment’s role in modern law, that is an approach worth heeding.

